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Abstract
Our analysis suggests that boards focus on deviation from expected performance, rather 
than performance alone, in making the CEO turnover decision, especially when there is 
agreement (less dispersion) among analysts about the firm’s earnings forecast or there are 
a large number of analysts following the firm. In addition, our results suggest that boards 
are more likely to appoint a CEO that will change firm policies and strategies (i.e., an out-
sider) when forecasted 5-year EPS growth is low and there is greater uncertainty (more 
dispersion) among analysts about the firm’s long-term forecasts.
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1. Introduction
Empirical evidence suggests there is an increased likelihood of CEO turnover 
following poor firm performance (e.g., Coughlan and Schmidt ,1985; Warner et 
al.,1988; Weisbach, 1988; Parrino, 1997). Evidence also indicates that CEOs are of-
ten blamed for poor firm performance even when their decisions are similar to 
the decisions made by the CEOs of comparable firms (e.g., Khanna and Poulsen, 
1995; Farrell and Whidbee, 2002). Studies that consider the replacement decision 
find that the board is more likely to appoint an outsider if the CEO turnover fol-
lows a period of poor firm performance (e.g., Parrino, 1997).
We examine CEO turnover and replacement decisions from a different per-
spective by examining the role of performance expectations. Similar to Puffer and 
Weintrop (1991), we argue that 1-year analyst forecast errors (the deviation of re-
alized earnings from expected earnings) provide additional information regarding 
a CEO’s performance beyond simple earnings. 1 To the extent that earnings fore-
casts proxy for the board of director’s earnings expectations, forecast errors may 
capture the component of firm performance that the board attributes, in large part, 
to CEO performance. Thus, we hypothesize that, controlling for overall firm per-
formance (e.g., return on assets (ROA) and stock returns), there will be a negative 
relation between forecast errors and CEO turnover. Moreover, we hypothesize 
that the relation between forecast errors and CEO turnover is stronger when the 
forecast error is more unexpected. We argue that a large negative forecast error is 
more unexpected when there was consensus among analysts (low dispersion) re-
garding the forecast. Specifically, we expect to observe a stronger relation between 
forecast errors and CEO turnover when the dispersion in the forecast is low.
We also propose that analysts’ earnings growth forecasts proxy for the mar-
ket’s and board’s assessment of a firm’s policies and strategies. Unlike historic 
performance measures (e.g., ROA) that likely reflect both the success of the firm’s 
policies and strategies and the CEO’s implementation of those policies and strat-
egies, forecasted earnings growth should capture, to a greater degree, the former. 
As a result, we hypothesize that, controlling for historical performance, the board 
will be more likely to appoint an outsider (who will be more likely to break with 
the failed policies and strategies of his/her predecessor) when earnings growth 
forecasts are low. Again, we hypothesize the relation between forecasted earn-
ings growth and the CEO replacement decision will be stronger when there is 
less uncertainty regarding the growth forecast.
Utilizing a sample of 4,015 firm-year observations that include 363 CEO turn-
overs during the 1986–1997 period, we find an inverse relation between the likeli-
hood of CEO turnover and industry-adjusted 1-year analyst forecast errors. These 
1 Puffer and Weintrop (1991) find an increased likelihood of CEO turnover when realized earnings 
fall short of analysts’ expectations. However, their study does not distinguish between forced and 
voluntary turnover nor does it examine the CEO replacement decision. DeFond and Park (1999) and 
Goyal and Park (2002) also document an inverse relation between the likelihood of CEO turnover 
and analyst forecast errors.
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results are not sensitive to the inclusion of controls for CEO age, firm size, in-
dustry homogeneity, or alternative proxies for firm performance. The results sug-
gest that CEOs are not simply held accountable for the overall level of firm per-
formance, but that boards of directors also use firm performance expectations as 
part of their criteria for evaluating CEO performance. Further, when industry-ad-
justed 1-year analyst forecast dispersion is low or the number of analysts follow-
ing a firm is high, CEOs with negative forecast errors face a greater likelihood of 
turnover. Again, consistent with our hypothesis, the results suggest that when 
the signal from the forecast error is more precise (e.g., there is less dispersion) it is 
accorded more weight in the turnover decision.
Conditional on CEO turnover, we find an inverse relation between industry-
adjusted 5-year EPS growth rate forecasts and the likelihood that an outsider 
is appointed CEO, even after controlling for firm size, the tenure of the out-
going CEO, industry homogeneity, the type of turnover (forced vs. voluntary) 
and multiple measures of firm performance. Counter to our hypothesized rela-
tion, the inverse relation between EPS growth rate forecasts and the likelihood 
that an outsider is appointed CEO is concentrated among those firms that ex-
hibit greater dispersion in analysts’ long-term EPS growth rate forecasts. These 
results suggest that boards appoint outsiders to make changes to firm policies 
and strategies when a firm’s 5-year earnings growth forecast is poor and there 
is greater uncertainty regarding the forecast. Overall, the implication is that 
boards of directors are willing to accept the uncertainty associated with an out-
side replacement CEO when their firm’s long-term prospects are both poor and 
uncertain.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the related litera-
ture and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 tests our 
predictions about the relation between performance expectations and the CEO 
turnover and replacement decisions. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Performance expectations and CEO turnover
2.1. One-year forecast errors as a measure of CEO performance
We argue that 1-year analyst forecasts represent a reasonable proxy for the 
board’s expectations of a CEO’s performance. Management prepares budgets for 
the next year that the board approves. The board then holds management respon-
sible for meeting the budget. These budgeted performance standards are likely 
used in management compensation packages.2 To the extent that analyst earnings 
forecasts are a proxy for information used by boards, forecast errors are likely to 
capture information about unexpected performance that the board attributes, in 
large part, to CEO performance.
2 DeFond et al. (2002) argue that 1-year analyst forecasts capture information about expected perfor-
mance that is used in CEO compensation plans.
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We recognize, however, that analyst forecasts are an imperfect proxy for 
board expectations and forecasts also capture a CEO’s ability to manage expec-
tations. Farrell and Whidbee (2002) argue that one of the CEOs responsibilities 
is to influence the public’s perception of the firm by influencing media cover-
age. They find evidence that increased scrutiny of poor firm performance by 
the financial press increases the likelihood of CEO turnover. Extending this ar-
gument suggests that a primary responsibility of the CEO is to manage analyst 
earnings expectations. 3
Evidence suggests that CEOs have incentives to both manage earnings and 
also manage earnings expectations. For example, Bartov et al. (2002) find evi-
dence that firms are becoming more successful in meeting or beating analyst 
earnings expectations in part due to firms managing analyst earnings expecta-
tions. 4 Kasznik and Lev (1995) and Soffer et al. (2000) find evidence that manage-
ment disclosure strategies regarding earnings announcements are consistent with 
managers attempting to manage analyst earnings expectations. Recent evidence 
suggests that CEOs attempt to manage analyst earnings expectations and manag-
ers who are better able to manage expectations realize economic benefits through 
larger bonuses (Matsunaga and Park, 2001) and higher stock option compensa-
tion values (Aboody and Kasznik, 2000).5
Although the expectations management literature suggests that analyst earn-
ings forecasts may differ from the board’s expectations, we argue that any devi-
ation of analyst forecasts from board expectations is due, in part, to the CEO’s 
inability to effectively manage analyst expectations or to the CEO’s inability to 
effectively manage the real assets of the firm. To the extent that the board views 
both roles as important in determining CEO performance, however, we would 
expect forecast errors to provide additional information regarding CEO perfor-
mance beyond other measures of firm performance that include both expected 
earnings and unexpected earnings (e.g., ROA and stock returns).
In addition to capturing CEO performance, analyst forecast errors also cap-
ture the impact of unanticipated events on firm performance. By using industry-
adjusted forecast errors in our analysis, we attempt to control for industry-wide 
events that affect performance. Previous research on CEO turnover decisions pro-
vides evidence suggesting that relative performance evaluation is utilized in re-
tention decisions (e.g., Barro and Barro, 1990; Blackwell et al., 1994). Therefore, 
our first hypothesis predicts that there will be an inverse relation between the 
likelihood of CEO turnover and industry-adjusted analyst forecast errors and 
3 Expectations management is consistent with the management literature regarding impressions man-
agement, which includes the idea that top management is expected to not only manage a firm’s per-
formance but also the perceptions of the firm’s performance (e.g., Ginzel et al., 1992).
4 Other studies analyze earnings management as a means to meet analyst earnings forecasts (e.g., 
Kasznik, 1999; Payne and Robb, 2000). Earnings management and expectations management are 
non-mutually exclusive explanations for meeting or beating analyst earnings expectations. See 
Healy and Wahlen (1999) for a review of the earnings management literature.
5 Managers also have the incentive to reduce negative forecast errors to avoid legal actions by share-
holders (Kasznik, 1999; Skinner, 1997).
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that analyst forecast errors have explanatory power beyond alternative firm per-
formance proxies such as ROA and stock returns.
Although we suggest that CEOs are held responsible for some expected level 
of performance, analyst forecasts may be a poor proxy for CEO performance ex-
pectations if the level of uncertainty associated with the firm’s original earnings 
forecast was high. For example, earnings expectations may be a poor proxy for 
CEO performance standards in firms that are facing a crisis (e.g., financial distress, 
a labor dispute, legal or regulatory action, or hostile takeover attempt) or that have 
substantial information asymmetry. For these firms, CEOs may be evaluated more 
on their ability to manage the firm through the crisis or board members may have 
performance expectations that differ substantially from analyst expectations.
Previous research suggests that the usefulness of a performance measure in 
a compensation contract is related to the extent to which it contains information 
about the CEO’s actions. According to this literature, a performance measure 
with a greater “signal-to-noise” ratio will receive a greater weight in the CEO’s 
compensation contract (e.g., Holmstrom, 1979). Lambert and Larcker (1987) and 
Sloan (1993), among others, provide evidence suggesting that optimal compen-
sation contracts place less reliance on performance measures when they contain 
considerable noise. Engel et al. (2002) make a similar argument concerning the 
CEO turnover decision. We extend this argument to suggest that the uncertainty 
associated with earnings forecasts impacts the degree to which boards hold CEOs 
accountable for firm performance expectations in the CEO turnover decision.6 
We expect earnings forecasts to be accorded less weight in the turnover decision 
when there is more uncertainty associated with the forecasts.
Therefore, our second hypothesis is that the association between the likeli-
hood of CEO turnover and analysts’ forecast errors is inversely related to analyst 
forecast dispersion. We measure the dispersion in analyst forecasts as the stan-
dard deviation of the EPS forecast at the beginning of the fiscal year divided by 
the absolute value of the consensus EPS forecast at the beginning of the fiscal year 
(similar to DeFond et al., 2002).7 Given the evidence that board members filter out 
industry effects in performance measures when making the CEO turnover deci-
sion (e.g., Weisbach, 1988; Parrino, 1997; DeFond and Park, 1999), we also expect 
board members to filter out industry effects in the uncertainty associated with 
firm performance. Further, some industries may tend to place more emphasis on 
performance expectations than other industries when evaluating CEO perfor-
mance. Alternatively, board members may be concerned with the overall uncer-
tainty associated with a firm’s earnings forecast. To allow for all these possibili-
ties, we decompose the dispersion measure into its industry and firm-specific (or 
6 DeFond et al. (2002) find evidence that directors rely less on expected earnings in constructing CEO per-
formance standards for compensation contracts when analyst earnings forecast dispersion increases.
7 Lambert and Larcker (1987) measure relative noise by computing the ratio of the historical stan-
dard deviation in ROA and the historical standard deviation in stock returns. Engel et al. (2002) use 
the ratio of the industry-adjusted variance of earnings divided by the industry-adjusted variance of 
monthly stock returns.
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industry-adjusted) components to test empirically whether total uncertainty, in-
dustry uncertainty, or firm-specific uncertainty affects the relation between ana-
lyst forecast errors and CEO turnover.8
2.2. Five-year EPS growth rate forecasts as an assessment of firm policies and strategies
Analysts’ long-term EPS growth rate forecasts attempt to capture the long-
term earnings potential for the firm based on the firm’s expected future growth 
opportunities. Unlike measures of past performance, these long-term forecasts 
are for a 5-year period in the future and tend to correspond with the typical ho-
rizon used in management strategic planning. We argue that analysts’ earnings 
growth rate forecasts are a reasonable proxy for the market’s and board’s assess-
ment of a firm’s policies and strategies. Since long-term planning may extend be-
yond a current CEO’s tenure, long-term forecasts implicitly capture analysts’ ex-
pectations associated with the policies and strategies of the firm as opposed to 
focusing solely on the abilities of the current CEO.
Therefore, our third hypothesis predicts a negative relation between 5-year 
EPS growth rate forecasts and the likelihood of an outside replacement.9 If a 
firm has sound policies and strategies in place, then its earnings growth pros-
pects will be high relative to other firms in its industry, the need to change course 
will be lower, and the attractiveness of internal candidates in the CEO replace-
ment decision will be higher. Firms with high growth prospects will be less likely 
to hire from outside the firm and more likely to promote from within. By exam-
ining whether expectations of future earnings growth have a greater impact on 
the CEO replacement decision than past performance, we test whether corporate 
boards distinguish between the performance of the outgoing CEO and the sound-
ness of firm policies and strategies.
To the extent that the dispersion in 5-year EPS growth rate forecasts captures 
disagreement among analysts (and board members) regarding a firm’s future 
earnings prospects, we would expect greater dispersion to be associated with 
more uncertainty regarding the soundness of the firm’s policies and strategies. 
With greater disagreement regarding the soundness of the policies and strategies, 
we would expect a weaker relation between the consensus earnings growth fore-
casts and the board’s CEO replacement decision. If, on the other hand, there is 
consensus among analysts (and board members) regarding earnings growth fore-
casts, then we would expect those forecasts to represent a more certain assess-
ment of the firm’s policies and strategies and have a significant impact on the 
CEO replacement decision.
8 Our analysis differs from Lambert and Larcker (1987), Sloan (1993), and Engel et al. (2002) since 
these studies focus on the relative use of stock returns vs. earnings in compensation contracts or 
turnover decisions while our study examines the extent to which performance expectations affect 
the turnover decision.
9 This prediction is consistent with the positive abnormal return associated with the announcement of 
an outside replacement following forced CEO turnover documented by Borokhovich et al. (1996).
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Therefore, our fourth hypothesis predicts a weaker relation between the 5-
year EPS growth rate forecast and outside CEO replacement when the dispersion 
in the 5-year EPS growth rate forecast is high. As in our test of hypothesis two, 
we measure the dispersion in the 5-year EPS growth rate forecast as the standard 
deviation of the forecast at the beginning of the fiscal year divided by the abso-
lute value of the consensus forecast at the beginning of the fiscal year. As in our 
specification of hypothesis two, we also decompose this dispersion measure into 
its industry and firm-specific (or industry-adjusted) components.
Based on the four hypotheses outlined above, our analysis allows us to com-
ment on the extent to which the CEO turnover and replacement decisions of cor-
porate boards are a reaction to poor performance and/or proactive attempts to 
improve firm policies and strategies.
3. Data and summary statistics
The sample of firms used in this study includes all firms in unregulated in-
dustries that satisfy the following criteria:
1.  The firm is included in the Execucomp database during the 1993–1997 period or 
appears in the Forbes Annual Survey of Compensation in the 1985–1992 period.10
2.  Any CEO turnovers are announced in the Wall Street Journal with age and ten-
ure data available for the outgoing CEO and incoming CEO in proxy state-
ments, Forbes, the Reference Book of Corporate Management, or the Million Dollar 
Directory.
3.  Financial statement data are available on the Compustat database and return 
data are available on the CRSP database.
4.  Analyst forecast data are available on the Zacks Investment Research 
database.11
We identified 363 turnovers in 4,015 firm years for 526 firms based on the above 
criteria.12 Outsiders, defined as a new CEO that joins the firm no more than 1 
year prior to the turnover announcement, were appointed to the CEO position in 
83 of the 363 turnovers.
10 Murphy and Zimmerman (1993) note that sample selections based on the Forbes 500 tend to bias a 
sample toward large, surviving, and growing firms. When possible, we include firms that drop out 
of the Forbes sample before the end of the 1992 period, as well as firms that appear in Forbes at any 
time during the sample period. Our turnover sample period ends in 1997 because we gathered an-
alyst forecast data 2 years beyond the turnover date and the analyst data available to us was lim-
ited to forecasts made through 1999.
11 We excluded a firm-year observation from the sample if it did not have at least three analyst fore-
casts of 1-year EPS and 5-year EPS growth rates at the beginning of the fiscal year. Although neces-
sary for our analysis, this further biases the sample toward larger firms.
12 Of the 526 firms in the sample, 254 experience no turnover, 199 experience one turnover, and 73 ex-
perience multiple turnovers.
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3.1. Classifying forced vs. voluntary CEO turnovers and inside vs. outside replacements
Our scheme for classifying turnovers as forced or voluntary is based on those 
of Weisbach (1988), Gilson (1989), and Parrino (1997) and incorporates elements 
of each. We classify as forced turnovers all CEO changes other than those arising 
from retirement, normal management succession, death, illness, or those involv-
ing the CEO’s departure for a prestigious position elsewhere. We initially assume 
a voluntary retirement for any departing CEO at least 64 years old unless we later 
uncover information suggesting the departure is performance-related.
We consult the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), Wall Street Journal Index (WSJI), or 
both for turnover reasons. First, we checked the WSJI, which in some cases pro-
vides an unambiguous reason for the CEO’s departure. If, however, the WSJI-rea-
son is unclear or if no reason is mentioned, we consult the full WSJ article. We 
also consult the full article for reported retirements, resignations, or normal man-
agement successions to determine whether these reasons are related to poor firm 
performance. Although we attempt to carefully identify forced and voluntary 
turnover, firms may not report a precise reason for the turnover (e.g., Warner et 
al., 1988; Weisbach, 1988) and rarely cite poor management performance as an ex-
planation of a CEO change (DeFond and Park, 1999). As a result, there may be er-
ror in our classification of forced and voluntary turnover. To control for this po-
tential misclassification, we include a dummy variable for CEO age in our model 
as noted in Section 3.3.
As depicted in Table 1, voluntary turnovers account for approximately 76.3 per-
cent of the turnovers in the sample or about seven percent of the sample observa-
tions. About 23.7 percent of turnovers or 2.1 percent of the sample observations are 
forced.13 We classify the new CEO as an outside replacement if he/she joined the 
firm less than 1 year before the CEO turnover announcement. All other new CEOs 
are classified as inside replacements. The most common type of turnover in Table 
1 is a voluntary turnover followed by an inside replacement (64.7 percent of turn-
overs or 5.9 percent of sample observations) and then a forced turnover followed 
by an inside replacement (12.4 percent of turnovers or 1.1 percent of sample obser-
vations). Approximately 11.3 percent of turnovers are forced turnovers followed by 
outside replacements and 11.6 percent are voluntary turnovers followed by outside 
replacements. In our sample, the incoming CEO is almost equally likely to be an in-
sider or outsider when following a forced turnover.14 However, of the 277 volun-
tary turnovers, 235 replacement CEOs are insiders (84.8 percent).
Similar to the trend documented in Huson et al. (2001), Table 1 shows that both 
forced turnovers and outside replacements have become more common in the lat-
13 For comparison, Huson et al. (2001) define 20 percent of their CEO turnovers as forced over the 
sample period 1983–1994 but document a higher incidence of forced turnover (23.4 percent) in the 
last sub-sample period in their study (1989–1994). Over the sample period 1984–1988, Denis and 
Denis (1995) classify between 18 and 21 percent of top executive changes as forced depending on 
the data restrictions applied.
14 For comparison, Denis and Denis (1995) document 57.1 percent and Huson et al. (2001) document 
53.5 percent of forced turnovers as being followed by outside replacements.
Fi r m p e r F o r ma n c e e x p ec tati o n s an d ceo tur n o v e r an d r ep l ac e me n t     173
ter part of the sample period. To control for the general increase in both events, 
we include year dummy variables in the empirical analysis of both turnovers and 
outside replacements.
3.2. EPS forecasts and other performance measures around CEO turnover
As an initial step toward examining the relation between firm performance 
expectations and the CEO turnover and replacement decisions, we examine the 
industry-adjusted median 1-year EPS forecast, forecast errors, 5-year EPS growth 
rate forecast, and ROA in the years surrounding turnover. Forecast errors are es-
timated as the deviation of realized EPS from the beginning-of-year forecasted 
EPS. Following Atiase and Bamber (1994), we scale the 1-year EPS forecast and 
forecast error by the beginning-of-year stock price to allow for comparability 
across firms.15 All measures are industry adjusted by differencing from industry 
medians, which are based on two-digit SIC codes.
Figure 1 illustrates the median forecast and performance measures in the years 
surrounding CEO turnover for the four turnover-replacement type combinations. 
Table 1. CEO turnovers and non-turnover observations by yeara
                      Forced turnovers                             Voluntary turnovers                 No turnover
                      Outside                Inside             Outside              Inside
Fiscal year      replacement      replacement     replacement       replacement
1986  1 (0.7%)  2 (1.4%)  0 (0.0%)  17 (12.1%)  120 (85.7%)
1987  3 (1.2%)  6 (2.4%)  1 (0.4%)  16 (6.5%)  220 (89.4%)
1988  3 (1.1%)  1 (0.4%)  0 (0.0%)  29 (10.1%)  253 (88.5%)
1989  2 (0.7%)  3 (1.0%)  0 (0.0%)  23 (7.6%)  276 (90.8%)
1990  3 (1.0%)  6 (1.9%)  2 (0.6%)  24 (7.6%)  281 (88.9%)
1991  1 (0.3%)  3 (1.0%)  5 (1.6%)  14 (4.6%)  285 (92.5%)
1992  1 (0.3%)  4 (1.3%)  1 (0.3%)  10 (3.1%)  303 (95.0%)
1993  6 (1.8%)  6 (1.8%)  7 (2.1%)  19 (5.7%)  296 (88.6%)
1994  4 (1.0%)  5 (1.2%)  6 (1.4%)  29 (7.0%)  372 (89.4%)
1995  3 (0.7%)  2 (0.4%)  8 (1.8%)  22 (4.9%)  415 (92.2%)
1996  10 (2.2%)  3 (0.7%)  7 (1.5%)  17 (3.7%)  420 (91.9%)
1997  4 (0.9%)  4 (0.9%)  5 (1.1%)  15 (3.4%)  411 (93.6%)
Total  41 (1.0%)  45 (1.1%)  42 (1.1%)  235 (5.9%)  3,652 (91.0%)
This table documents the number and percentage of firm-year observations that are turnovers by 
type of turnover and whether the replacement CEO is an outsider or insider for each year in the 
1986–1997 period for which we have sufficient analyst forecast data.
a Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding.
15 Our results are robust to scaling by total assets per share. We chose not to compute the forecast 
error as a percent of the initial forecast because firms may have very small or even negative 1-
year EPS forecasts. The forecast errors for these firms would be difficult to interpret. In addition, 
scaling by stock price per share is more likely to capture the economic meaningfulness of the 
forecast error.
174   Far r e ll & Wh i d be e i n Jou r na l of ac c ou nt i ng a nd Ec on om i c s 36 (2003) 
Fi
gu
re
 1
. M
ed
ia
n 
in
du
st
ry
-a
dj
us
te
d 
EP
S 
fo
re
ca
st
s,
 fo
re
ca
st
 e
rr
or
s,
 a
nd
 n
et
 in
co
m
e/
as
se
ts
 in
 th
e 
ye
ar
s 
su
rr
ou
nd
in
g 
tu
rn
ov
er
. N
ot
e: 
Th
e 
in
du
st
ry
-
ad
ju
st
ed
 1
-y
ea
r E
PS
 fo
re
ca
st
 is
 m
ea
su
re
d 
as
 fo
re
ca
st
ed
 E
PS
 a
t t
he
 b
eg
in
ni
ng
 o
f t
he
 y
ea
r/
st
oc
k 
pr
ic
e 
at
 th
e 
be
gi
nn
in
g 
of
 th
e 
ye
ar
. T
he
 in
du
st
ry
-a
d-
ju
st
ed
 a
n
al
ys
t f
or
ec
as
t e
rr
or
s 
ar
e 
m
ea
su
re
d
 a
s 
(r
ea
li
ze
d
 E
P
S−
fo
re
ca
st
ed
 E
P
S 
at
 th
e 
be
gi
n
n
in
g 
of
 th
e 
ye
ar
)/
st
oc
k 
p
ri
ce
 a
t t
h
e 
be
gi
n
n
in
g 
of
 th
e 
ye
ar
. 
Th
e 
in
du
st
ry
-a
dj
us
te
d 
5-
ye
ar
 E
PS
 g
ro
w
th
 ra
te
 is
 m
ea
su
re
d 
at
 th
e 
be
gi
nn
in
g 
of
 th
e 
ye
ar
. A
na
ly
st
 fo
re
ca
st
 e
rr
or
s a
nd
 R
O
A
 a
re
 m
ea
su
re
d 
at
 th
e 
en
d 
of
 t
h
e 
ye
ar
. T
h
e 
n
u
m
be
r 
of
 o
bs
er
va
ti
on
s 
va
ri
es
 o
ve
r 
ti
m
e 
as
 t
h
e 
n
u
m
be
r 
of
 fi
rm
s 
w
it
h
 c
om
p
le
te
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 a
ls
o 
va
ri
es
 o
ve
r 
ti
m
e.
 D
et
ai
le
d
 n
u
m
-
be
rs
 a
re
 a
va
ila
bl
e 
fr
om
 th
e 
au
th
or
s.
 
Fi r m p e r F o r ma n c e e x p ec tati o n s an d ceo tur n o v e r an d r ep l ac e me n t     175
When interpreting the data in Figure 1, note that the 1-year, industry-adjusted 
EPS forecasts (Panel A) and industry-adjusted 5-year EPS growth forecasts (Panel 
C) are measured at the beginning of the year and, accordingly, reflect expecta-
tions. The industry-adjusted forecast error (Panel B) and industry-adjusted ROA 
(Panel D), on the other hand, represent realizations as they are measured at the 
end of the corresponding year.
Figure 1 reveals substantial variation in the four types of succession events 
across the alternative performance measures. In Panel A, the 1-year, industry-ad-
justed EPS forecasts for the firms experiencing voluntary turnover with inside re-
placement are significantly greater than zero in most years, suggesting that these 
firms are expected to consistently perform better than their industry peers. How-
ever, the median industry-adjusted EPS forecasts for the other three turnover cat-
egories typically are not significantly different from zero.16
Consistent with Puffer and Weintrop (1991), industry-adjusted EPS forecast 
errors tend to be negative in the year prior to turnover, especially for the firms 
that experience forced turnovers. This suggests that the likelihood of CEO turn-
over is inversely related to the difference between realized earnings and earnings 
forecasts. Puffer and Weintrop (1991) suggest that analysts perform an important 
monitoring function in which they establish performance benchmarks that man-
agers are expected to meet. Similarly, analyst forecasts may reflect the board’s 
performance expectations. Their results may be due to the board removing senior 
managers that fail to meet expectations.
In the year of turnover, the median forecast errors are significantly negative 
for the forced turnovers and the voluntary turnovers with outside replacement in 
Panel B of Figure 1. In the year prior to turnover, the median forecast errors are 
significantly negative for the forced turnovers. These negative forecast errors are 
consistent with the increased likelihood of turnover surrounding poor firm per-
formance and may simply reflect the poor performance of the exiting CEO. Con-
sistent with studies that find significant improvements in firm performance fol-
lowing CEO turnover (e.g., Denis and Denis, 1995), Panel B shows that median 
forecast errors are no longer negative by the second year after CEO turnover for 
all turnover types.
The industry-adjusted 5-year EPS growth rate forecasts shown in Panel C of 
Figure 1 indicate that those firms experiencing an outside replacement also tend 
to be those with the most pessimistic forecasts. Since it is more difficult for large 
firms to maintain the same growth rates as small firms and our sample selection 
criteria biases the sample toward larger firms, it is not surprising that the median 
industry-adjusted 5-year EPS growth rate forecast at the beginning of the year in 
which turnover occurs is negative and statistically significant for all turnover cat-
egories in Panel C. In the years after turnover, Panel C of Figure 1 suggests little, 
if any, improvements in the 5-year EPS growth rate forecast. The voluntary turn-
over firms with inside replacements continue to suffer a decline in their growth 
16 In results not shown, we test whether the median figures illustrated in Figure 1 differ significantly 
from zero using the non-parametric, signed rank statistic. These results are available from the authors.
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rate forecasts. This is consistent with the improvement in forecast errors in the 
years after turnover for all but the voluntary turnovers with inside replacement.
For comparison purposes, we also include the industry-adjusted ROA in the 
years surrounding turnover in Panel D of Figure 1. Borokhovich et al. (1996) find 
that firms with a low EBIT-to-assets ratio in the year prior to turnover are signif-
icantly more likely to appoint an outside successor. Panel D shows that the me-
dian ROA is negative and statistically significant in the year prior to turnover for 
the forced-turnover types and the voluntary turnovers with outside replacement. 
In addition, the median ROA is negative and statistically significant in the year of 
forced turnover for both inside and outside replacement.
3.3. Control variables
In addition to the EPS forecasts and performance measures discussed above, 
we expect other variables to affect the CEO turnover and replacement decisions. 
The median and mean of these variables along with the EPS forecast and perfor-
mance measures are shown in Table 2. For the turnover observations, the vari-
ables are measured at the end of the fiscal year prior to the year in which the 
turnover was announced. For the no turnover observations, Table 2 reports the 
median and means across all firm-year observations.
To control for the level of uncertainty in earnings estimates, we analyze the ef-
fect of the dispersion in analyst forecasts on the likelihood of CEO turnover and the 
likelihood of an outside replacement. The dispersion in analyst earnings forecasts is 
measured as the standard deviation of the EPS forecast scaled by the absolute value 
of the consensus EPS forecast. For descriptive purposes, we report the mean and me-
dian of two dispersion measures in Table 2. The first dispersion measure is indus-
try adjusted by differencing from industry medians, which are based on two-digit 
SIC codes. The second dispersion measure captures total dispersion. In the empiri-
cal analysis that follows, we create two dummy variables: a dummy variable that is 
equal to one if the median dispersion for the firm’s industry is greater than the me-
dian for all firms, zero otherwise; and a dummy variable that is equal to one if the 
firm’s dispersion measure is greater than the industry median, zero otherwise.
While the dispersion in analyst forecasts measures the level of uncertainty or 
disagreement in earnings estimates, it may also capture differences in the level 
of firm complexity not captured by other control variables (e.g., firm size and in-
dustry homogeneity).17 Therefore, the results concerning the dispersion measures 
should be interpreted with caution.
Table 2 shows that outside replacements are associated with greater total dis-
persion and firm-specific dispersion in both 1-year EPS forecasts and 5-year EPS 
growth rate forecasts, which suggests that boards of directors are more likely to 
appoint an outside replacement when there is greater uncertainty associated with 
17 The correlations between our industry homogeneity measure, the forecast dispersion measures, 
and firm size are all relatively small. The absolute value of the mean cross-sectional correlations 
between the various combinations of variables is consistently below 0.10.
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future earnings prospects. We are unable to draw inferences regarding our sec-
ond hypothesis that the association between the likelihood of CEO turnover and 
analysts’ forecast errors is inversely related to analyst forecast dispersion from 
the descriptive statistics since our hypothesis suggests an interaction between the 
forecast error and forecast dispersion variables. Similarly, our fourth hypothesis 
suggests an interaction between 5-year EPS growth rate forecasts and the disper-
sion in the forecast. We revisit these hypotheses in Section 4. As an additional 
control, we also include a measure of the number of analysts making a 1-year EPS 
forecast. As noted in Table 2, the median number of analysts for the various cat-
egories ranges from 12 to 15 but is not significantly different between firms with 
inside and outside replacements.
Several studies find a positive relation between the likelihood of CEO turnover 
and firm size (e.g., Huson et al., 2001). In addition, other studies find that larger 
firms are more likely to appoint an insider to replace an outgoing CEO (e.g., Par-
rino, 1997). One potential explanation for this empirical regularity is that smaller 
firms tend to have fewer senior managers that are qualified to replace the outgoing 
CEO and an outside candidate is more likely to be effective in a smaller, less com-
plex organization. Following Borokhovich et al. (1996) and Agrawal et al. (2001), we 
use the natural log of the number of firm employees as a proxy for size.18
CEO age is also expected to affect the likelihood of CEO turnover. Table 2 shows 
CEO age measured two ways. First, we measure the CEO age in years. Second, 
we measure CEO age using a dummy variable to indicate whether a firm’s CEO 
is older than 60 years of age. The voluntary turnovers that are followed by an in-
side replacement tend to be the oldest group with a median (mean) age of 64 (63.1) 
while the forced turnovers that are followed by an outside replacement tend to be 
the youngest group with a median (mean) age of 55 (55.5). The median and mean 
of the CEO age dummy variable echo these results. Following Borokhovich et al. 
(1996) and Parrino (1997), we include the CEO age dummy in the analysis that fol-
lows rather than CEO age. The likelihood of forced CEO turnover seems unrelated 
to CEO age while the likelihood of voluntary turnover seems to increase once a 
CEO reaches the age of 60, but does not increase linearly beyond the age of 60.
When analyzing the choice between an inside vs. outside CEO replacement, the 
tenure of the outgoing CEO may be important. When an outgoing CEO has been in 
place for a long time, he or she is more likely to have a designated successor. The 
outgoing CEO likely has significant influence on the replacement decision because 
of his or her power over the board (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998), which arguably 
increases with tenure. Also, the long tenure may be indicative of the board’s favor-
able assessment of the current direction of the firm. We include the number of years 
the outgoing CEO has been in office as an independent variable to control for these 
possibilities. Table 2 indicates that the mean tenure of the outgoing CEO is longer 
in those firms that appoint an inside CEO as illustrated by CEO tenure of 8.9 and 
10.3 years for forced and voluntary turnover with inside replacement, respectively.
18 Alternative proxies for size (log of sales, log of assets, log of market capitalization) yield similar 
results.
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Parrino (1997) finds evidence that CEO turnovers and outside replacements 
are more likely in homogeneous industries due to the increased availability of 
strong outside candidates. DeFond and Park (1999) find that the frequency of 
CEO turnover is greater in highly competitive industries than in less competi-
tive industries. Industry competition and homogeneity are likely to be highly cor-
related. We include industry homogeneity in our analysis because it has been 
shown to be important in the replacement decision as well as the turnover deci-
sion. Following Parrino, we construct a proxy for industry homogeneity and in-
clude this variable in the analysis to control for the availability of an outside can-
didate on both the CEO turnover and replacement decisions.19
Consistent with the evidence shown in Figure 1, Table 2 indicates that the 
firms experiencing turnover, especially forced turnover, tend to perform worse 
than those not experiencing turnover regardless of how performance is mea-
sured. There is no significant difference in industry-adjusted stock returns, how-
ever, between the turnover firms with inside replacements and those with out-
side replacements. Nevertheless, we include industry-adjusted stock returns in 
our analyses so that our results are comparable to other studies that include stock 
returns in their analysis.
3.4. Correlations between performance and analyst forecast variables
The preceding analysis suggests that many of the performance measures 
and analyst forecast variables might be correlated with each other. To assess 
whether our analysis might suffer from multicollinearity, we examine the mean 
cross-sectional correlation coefficients between these variables in Table 3., 20 The 
mean correlation between ROA and the analyst forecast error is 0.568, indicat-
ing that these two measures of past performance are positively correlated. Nei-
ther ROA nor the analyst forecast errors are significantly related to the 1-year 
EPS forecast. All measures of past performance are positively correlated with 
the 5-year EPS growth rate forecast while the 1-year EPS forecast and the 5-year 
19 First, we estimate a two-factor market model over the 1986–1997 period using monthly returns for 
up to 50 randomly selected firms from each industry where we exclude those firms that do not 
have at least 36 months of return data available and those industries that do not have at least 35 
firms with sufficient return data. Industries are defined by two-digit SIC codes. The first factor in 
the regression is the CRSP equally weighted return index for the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq. The 
second factor is an equally weighted industry return index constructed from the same randomly 
selected group of firms. Second, we determine the partial correlation coefficient for the industry re-
turn index in each individual-company regression. Third, we determine the average of these par-
tial correlation coefficients for each industry. The average partial correlation coefficient for each in-
dustry is our proxy for industry homogeneity.
20 We calculate the mean cross-sectional Pearson correlation coefficients for all the performance and 
analyst forecast variables. The mean correlation coefficients are calculated over the entire sample 
of firm-year observations, including both the turnover observations and the non-turnover observa-
tions. Specifically, we calculate the cross-sectional correlation coefficients for each fiscal year and 
then analyze the mean of these coefficients. The detailed results regarding correlation coefficients 
for all independent variables are available from the authors.
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EPS growth rate forecast are negatively correlated. Although not shown in the 
table, we also note a negative correlation of −0.253 between firm size, as mea-
sured by the log of the number of firm employees, and the industry-adjusted 
5-year EPS growth rate forecast. We also expect firm size and growth rates to 
have opposing effects on the likelihood of outside replacement. Given the rela-
tively high correlations between some of the performance measures, our analy-
sis may lack power due to multicollinearity. Therefore, we estimate alternative 
specifications of our model in Section 4.
4. Determinants of CEO turnover and replacement choice
Consistent with our expectations and arguments, the univariate evidence pre-
sented above suggests a significant relation between analyst forecast errors and 
CEO turnover as well as a significant relation between 5-year EPS growth rate ex-
pectations and the choice of replacement CEO. The evidence is not conclusive, 
however, and does not control for other factors likely to affect both the CEO turn-
over and replacement decisions. Further, we have not considered the potential in-
terdependencies between the two decisions. We do not observe a board’s pref-
erence for an outside candidate unless there is a CEO turnover. In addition, the 
CEO turnover decision may be influenced by the availability of a suitable replace-
ment. Following Borokhovich et al. (1996), we examine the simultaneous nature 
of the CEO turnover and replacement decisions more formally by estimating the 
following bivariate probit model:
Ti* = β′1X1i + ε1i,      Ti = 1  if Ti* > 0,     0 otherwise,                  (1)
Oi* = β′2X2i + ε2i,      Oi = 1  if Oi* > 0,    0 otherwise,                 (2)
where Ti* and Oi* are linear functions of the variables that affect the probabil-
ity of CEO turnover and the probability of an outside replacement, respectively. 
The residuals ε1i and ε2i are distributed as bivariate normal with correlation coef-
ficient ρ. The observed forms of Ti* and Oi* are the dichotomous Ti and Oi, where 
Ti is equal to one for firms that experience turnover in a given year, zero for firms 
that do not experience turnover in a given year, and Oi is equal to one for outside 
appointments, zero for inside appointments. Note that Oi is only observed when 
Ti=1, indicating a form of sample selectivity. We estimate (1) and (2) simultane-
ously using a full information maximum likelihood estimator that controls for the 
correlation in error terms of the two equations and the sample selectivity. Specifi-
cally, the log-likelihood function is
           log L =      ∑  log Φ2[β′1Χ1i, β′2Χ2i, ρ] 
                                  i, Oi = 1, Ti = 1   
                            +  ∑   log Φ2[β′1Χ1i, –β′2Χ2i, – ρ] –   ∑   log Φ1[–β′1Χ1i]                   (3)
                                       i, Oi = 0, Ti = 1                                                                              i, Ti = 0     
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where Φ2 is the bivariate standard normal cumulative distribution function and 
Φ1 is the univariate standard normal cumulative distribution function.21
Table 4 shows the results of estimating the bivariate probit model. Panel A of 
Table 4 shows the results for Equation (1), the turnover equation. Panel B of Table 
4 shows the results for Equation (2), the outside replacement equation. All of the 
estimated models include year dummy variables, but the coefficients associated 
with these variables are not shown for brevity.22 Note that Model 1 in Panel A in-
cludes the same variables as Models 3 and 4 and that Model 2 includes the same 
variables as Model 5. The variation in the results of these models can be attrib-
uted to the differences in the variables that are included in Equation (2) of the bi-
variate probit model. It is worth noting, however, that the results for Equation (1) 
are largely invariant to the specification of Equation (2).
4.1. Bivariate probit results for the likelihood of CEO turnover
As shown in Panel A of Table 4, we find a much greater likelihood of turnover 
for older CEOs. In addition, the CEOs of large firms are more likely to experience 
turnover than their small firm counterparts. Both industry-adjusted ROA and the 
industry-adjusted analyst forecast errors are inversely related to the likelihood of 
CEO turnover in all of the model specifications. When all the performance vari-
ables are included (Model 6), the coefficient on industry-adjusted stock returns is 
not significant.
These results suggest that while the overall level of firm performance is in-
versely related to the likelihood of CEO turnover, the unexpected component of 
firm performance, as measured by industry-adjusted analyst forecast errors, also 
has a significant impact on the likelihood of CEO turnover. This is consistent with 
the argument that the board of directors distinguishes between firm performance 
and CEO performance by holding the CEO accountable for the firm’s failure to 
meet earnings expectations.
Although both industry-adjusted ROA and the industry-adjusted analyst fore-
cast errors are statistically significant in explaining the likelihood of CEO turn-
over, their economic significance is small. Other studies note that the incidence 
of CEO turnover is very low in even the worst performing firms. For example, 
Huson et al. (2001) find that the frequency of CEO turnover varies from approx-
imately nine percent to 15 percent over four sub-sample periods between 1971 
and 1994 for firms in the lowest quartile of accounting return performance. The 
rate of CEO turnover in the highest quartile of accounting return performance 
in their sample is only slightly lower, varying from approximately seven percent 
to 12 percent. Further, they estimate the implied probabilities of a forced turn-
over for their sample and find that the likelihood of a forced CEO turnover in a 
given year is only 2.64 percent greater in the lowest quartile of firm performance 
21 See Greene (1997) for a detailed description of the bivariate probit methodology.
22 The results concerning the year dummy variables are consistent with the general increase in the 
likelihood of outside replacement in the years after 1992, as suggested by Table 1.
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(industry-adjusted EBIT/assets) than in the highest quartile of firm performance 
over the 1989–1994 period. Consistent with these results, the implied probability 
of CEO turnover increases by 1.14 percent and 0.88 percent in our sample when 
the industry-adjusted ROA and industry-adjusted analyst forecast errors decline 
by one standard deviation, respectively.23
4.2. Bivariate probit results for the likelihood of an outside replacement
Panel B of Table 4 shows the results for Equation (2), the outside replacement 
equation, in the bivariate probit model. As expected, those firms in which the out-
going CEO has been in place for many years are less likely to appoint an outsider. 
The coefficient for the tenure of the outgoing CEO is negative and statistically sig-
nificant in all the model specifications. Models 3, 5, and 6 include a forced-turn-
over dummy variable because Table 1 suggests an increased incidence of an out-
side appointment following a forced turnover. Consistent with previous studies 
(e.g., Agrawal et al., 2001), the coefficient for the forced-turnover dummy variable 
is consistently positive and statistically significant. This suggests that the board of 
directors is more likely to appoint an outside replacement after they have forced 
the removal of the previous CEO.
With the exception of industry-adjusted stock returns, the historical perfor-
mance measures have the expected effect on the likelihood that an outside CEO 
is appointed, but the coefficients are not statistically significant when the forced-
turnover variable is also included. This suggests that while historical performance 
may affect the likelihood of CEO turnover and the type of turnover, as found in 
other studies, it does not have a statistically significant impact on the choice of re-
placement CEO beyond its impact on the type of turnover.
As expected, the industry-adjusted 5-year EPS growth rate forecast is in-
versely related to the likelihood that an outsider is appointed CEO, suggesting 
that those firms with poor long-term earnings prospects are more likely to ap-
point an outsider. In addition, we find little evidence that outside replacement is 
motivated by poor past performance except to the extent that poor past perfor-
mance is reflected in the board’s decision to forcibly remove the previous CEO. 
Rather than reacting to poor performance by appointing an outside CEO, the evi-
dence found here suggests that boards of directors appoint an outside CEO in an 
effort to change future earnings prospects.
23 The changes in the implied probability of CEO turnover are derived from the marginal effects of 
decreases in the industry-adjusted ROA and industry-adjusted analyst forecast errors in a univari-
ate probit model that includes the variables shown in Model 6 of Panel A in Table 4. The reason we 
estimate the marginal effects using a univariate probit model is that the usual marginal effects cal-
culated for a bivariate probit model considers the direct as well as the indirect impact of explana-
tory variables on the probabilities associated with the dependent variables. Because our bivariate 
probit model involves sample selectivity, however, the only marginal effects we can adequately 
determine are the marginal effects of the explanatory variables on the probability of an outside ap-
pointment conditional on observing a CEO turnover.
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Conditional on CEO turnover, the probability of an outside replacement in-
creases by 6.57 percent when the industry-adjusted 5-year EPS growth rate de-
clines by one standard deviation (6.65 percent).24 Given that only 22.9 percent of 
the appointments in our sample are outside appointments, a 6.57 percent increase 
in the probability of such appointments is economically meaningful, suggesting 
that poor long-term earnings prospects have an important impact on the likeli-
hood of an outside appointment.
Consistent with our first and third hypotheses, the evidence presented in Ta-
ble 4 indicates an inverse relation between analyst forecast errors and CEO turn-
over as well as an inverse relation between 5-year EPS growth rate expectations 
and the appointment of an outside CEO. To determine the robustness of our re-
sults, we re-estimate Model 6 from Table 4 using industry-adjusted EBIT-to-assets 
and industry-adjusted net operating cash flow-to-assets in place of industry-ad-
justed ROA. We find an inverse relation between analyst forecast errors and the 
likelihood of CEO turnover independent of the alternative performance measure 
used. Likewise, our results for outside replacement are qualitatively the same as 
those reported in Panel B of Table 4. Overall, our conclusions are robust to alter-
native firm performance measures and model specifications.
4.3. Bivariate probit results including the dispersion of analyst forecasts
To more formally analyze whether boards hold CEOs accountable for earn-
ings estimates, we specify Model 6 from Table 4 to include controls for the dis-
persion in analyst forecasts. Following DeFond et al. (2002), we define the disper-
sion of analyst forecasts as dummy variables due to the skewness in the variable. 
Unlike Defond et al., however, we decompose the dispersion variable into its in-
dustry component and its firm-specific component. Specifically, we create two 
dummy variables: a dummy variable that is equal to one if the median industry 
dispersion measure is greater than the median for all firms, zero otherwise; and 
a dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm’s dispersion measure is greater 
than the industry median, zero otherwise.
To determine whether the association between the likelihood of CEO turnover 
and analysts’ forecast errors is related to analyst forecast dispersion, we also spec-
ify an interaction term between the forecast dispersion dummy variables and the 
analyst forecast error variable. Note that our total number of observations falls 
from 4,015 to 3,987 and the number of turnovers falls from 363 to 360 due to data 
limitations associated with the dispersion variables.
Panel A in Table 5 shows that there is a positive and significant relation be-
tween CEO turnover and the interaction between high firm-specific dispersion 
and industry-adjusted analyst forecast errors. Consistent with our second hypoth-
esis, when firm-specific analyst forecast dispersion is high, analyst forecast errors 
24 The marginal effects of the variables in Model 6, Panel B of Table 4 are conditional on CEO turn-
over. The effects are evaluated at the means of the explanatory variables across all observations. 
See Greene (1997) for a discussion of marginal effects in a bivariate probit model.
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Table 5. Bivariate probit regression results with the dispersion in analyst forecasts included
Explanatory variables                         Expected sign       Model 7         Model 8           Model 9
Panel A: dependent variable—CEO turnover
Constant   –2.295 *** –2.286 *** –2.271 ***
  (–7.749) (–7.654) (–7.659)
CEO age dummy (1 if CEO is  (+)  0.797 *** 0.802 *** 0.800 ***  
     older than 60, 0 otherwise)  (12.181) (12.223) (12.210)
Log of the number of firm  (+)  0.065 *** 0.065 *** 0.064 ***  
 
     employees   (2.655) (2.624) (2.618)
Industry homogeneity  (+)  0.410 0.473 0.477
  (0.607) (0.705) (0.733)
Industry-adjusted stock returns  (–)  –0.152 –0.154 –0.155
  (–1.447) (–1.436) (–1.456)
Industry-adjusted ROA  (–)  –1.139 ** –1.035 * –1.049 *  
     (net income/assets)  (–2.035) (–1.757) (–1.816)
Industry-adjusted analyst forecast (–)  –0.876 *** –3.218 *** –2.718 *** 
     errors  (–2.850) (–2.983) (–3.008)
High firm-specific dispersion in  (±)  0.058 0.072 0.073 
     1-year EPS forecast dummy variable  (0.875) (1.063) (1.086)
High industry dispersion in 1-year  (±)  –0.005 0.007  
     EPS forecast dummy variable  (–0.079) (0.111)
High firm-specific dispersion × industry- (+)   2.133 **   2.091 ** 
     adjusted analyst forecast errors   (2.284) (2.256)
High industry dispersion × industry- (+)   0.643 
     adjusted analyst forecast errors   (0.915)
Panel B: dependent variable—outside replacement  
Constant   –1.334 –1.121 –1.212
  (–1.281) (–0.959) (–1.056)
Log of the number of firm employees  (–)  –0.122 –0.138 –0.131
  (–1.438) (–1.515) (–1.479)
Tenure of the outgoing CEO  (–)  –0.026 * –0.029 * –0.029 *
  (–1.783) (–1.872) (–1.889)
Industry homogeneity  (+)  2.103 2.559 2.793
  (1.084) (1.243) (1.418)
Industry-adjusted stock returns  (–)  0.315 0.414 * 0.402
  (1.304) (1.535) (1.535)
Forced turnover of outgoing CEO  (+)  0.707 *** 0.736 *** 0.720 ***
  (2.824) (2.925) (2.867)
Industry-adjusted ROA  (–)  –2.060 –2.570 –2.586 
     (net income/assets)  (–1.265) (–1.410) (–1.454)
Industry-adjusted analyst forecast (–)  –0.197 0.089 0.048
     errors  (–0.182) (0.072) (0.040)
Industry-adjusted 1-year EPS forecast  (±)  –2.365 –2.035 –2.201
  (–0.872) (–0.710) (–0.786)
Industry-adjusted 5-year EPS growth (–)  –2.447 1.943 1.979
     rate forecast  (–1.458) (0.632) (0.778)
High firm-specific dispersion in 5-year (±)  0.321 0.219 0.223
     EPS growth forecast dummy variable  (1.596) (1.052) (1.093)
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have a weaker impact on the likelihood of CEO turnover. This suggests that ana-
lyst forecast errors are afforded less weight in the turnover decision when there is 
more uncertainty relative to other firms in the industry regarding earnings fore-
casts. Our evidence is consistent with DeFond et al. (2002) who find that disper-
sion in analysts’ forecasts weakens the ability of the forecasts to explain the CEO 
pay–performance relation.25
Table 5 (continued).
Explanatory variables                          Expected sign       Model 7          Model 8         Model 9
High industry dispersion in 5-year EPS (±)  0.103 0.102 
     growth forecast dummy variable  (0.560) (0.493)
High firm-specific dispersion × industry- (+)   –10.584 *** –10.453 ** 
     adjusted 5-year growth rate forecast   (–2.680) (–2.645)
High industry dispersion × industry- (+)   0.183  
     adjusted 5-year EPS growth rate forecast   (0.051)
Log likelihood function for bivariate probit  –1,230.88  –1,223.08  –1,223.72
This table shows the bivariate probit regression results (with asymptotic t-statistics) of the likelihood 
of CEO turnover and an outside replacement for a sample of 3,987 firm-year observations, including 
360 CEO turnovers of which 83 result in outside replacements. We eliminated 28 of the original 
4,015 firm-year observations, including three turnover observations, due to insufficient forecast 
dispersion data. There are two dependent variables: Panel A one if CEO turnover occurs in a given 
firm year (zero otherwise) and Panel B one if the replacement CEO was appointed from outside 
the firm (zero if the replacement CEO was appointed from within the firm). The model is estimated 
as a bivariate probit model to control for the potential correlation in error terms for the two 
models. In addition, the model adjusts for sample selectivity bias because we only observe the 
preference for an outsider when turnover occurs. The independent variables are as follows. Dummy 
variables for each year are included in both the CEO turnover and outside replacement models. 
For brevity, however, the results concerning the time dummy variables are not shown here. Industry 
homogeneity is measured over the 1986–1997 period using the approach described by Parrino 
(1997). Unless otherwise noted, all other variables are measured at the end of the previous fiscal 
year. Log of the number of firm employees is our proxy for firm size. Tenure of the outgoing CEO 
is measured in years. The CEO age dummy variable takes on a value of one if the CEO is over the 
age of 60, zero otherwise. Forced turnover of outgoing CEO is a dummy variable that takes on a 
value of one if the turnover of the outgoing CEO was forced, zero if the turnover was voluntary. 
Industry-adjusted stock returns and ROA (net income/assets) are measured over the previous fiscal 
year. Industry-adjusted analyst forecast error is (realized EPS for the previous year − forecasted EPS 
at the beginning of the previous year)/stock price at the beginning of the previous year. Industry-
adjusted 1-year EPS forecast is forecasted EPS for the year measured at the beginning of the 
year/stock price at the beginning of the year. Industry-adjusted 5-year EPS growth rate forecast is 
measured at the beginning of the year. The dispersions in forecasts are measured as the minimum of 
10 or the standard deviation of the forecast divided by the absolute value of the forecast. The high 
firm-specific dispersion dummy variables are equal to one if the firm’s dispersion is higher than the 
industry median, zero otherwise. The high industry dispersions dummy variables are equal to one 
if the median industry dispersion is greater than the median for all firms, zero otherwise. Industry-
adjusted variables are differenced from industry medians based on two-digit SIC codes. ***, * *, and 
*  indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
25  find evidence of lower bonuses for CEOs missing consensus earnings forecasts. Our results sug-
gest a more severe penalty of turnover if CEOs miss earnings forecasts when analysts’ dispersion 
is low.
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The coefficients for the industry dispersion dummy variable and the interac-
tion between the industry dispersion dummy variable and industry-adjusted an-
alyst forecast errors are not significant. In results not shown, we estimate Models 
7, 8, and 9 using one dummy variable based on whether the dispersion in ana-
lyst forecasts is greater than the median for all firms, and find insignificant re-
sults concerning this dispersion variable and the interaction between the dis-
persion variable and industry-adjusted forecast errors.26 Overall, these results 
suggest that relative uncertainty rather than total uncertainty affects the relation 
between industry-adjusted analyst forecast errors and CEO turnover. The impli-
cation is that analyst forecasts serve as a reasonable proxy for the board’s CEO 
performance expectations and any deviation of firm performance from those ex-
pectations increases the likelihood of CEO turnover only when the dispersion as-
sociated with the firm’s earnings forecast is less than the industry median.
To the extent that analyst forecast dispersion captures disagreement among 
analysts (and board members) regarding a firm’s future earnings prospects, hy-
pothesis four predicts that more dispersion in the 5-year EPS growth rate fore-
casts will be associated with a weaker signal regarding the soundness of the 
firm’s policies and strategies. Similar to the dispersion in 1-year EPS forecasts, we 
define two dummy variables: a dummy variable that is equal to one if the median 
industry dispersion measure is greater than the median for all firms, zero other-
wise; and a dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm’s dispersion measure 
is greater than the industry median, zero otherwise.
Contrary to our fourth hypothesis, Models 8 and 9 in Panel B of Table 5 indi-
cate that the negative relation between 5-year EPS growth rate forecasts and the 
likelihood of an outside appointment only holds when the firm-specific disper-
sion in analyst forecasts is high. The coefficient on the 5-year EPS growth rate 
forecast is not statistically significant while the coefficient on the interaction be-
tween the 5-year EPS growth rate forecast and firm-specific dispersion in the fore-
cast is negative and statistically significant.27
The results in Panel B of Table 5 suggest that board members are more will-
ing to make a significant change in firm leadership by appointing an outside CEO 
when the firm’s industry-adjusted consensus long-term earnings forecast is pessi-
mistic and there is greater firm-specific uncertainty about the forecast. Contrary to 
our expectations, when there is agreement among analysts about the firm’s long-
term earnings prospects, analysts’ expectations have no significant impact on the 
26 Similarly, when we substitute non-industry-adjusted performance variables for the industry-ad-
justed performance variables in Models 7, 8, and 9, the coefficients on the dispersion variable and 
the interaction between the dispersion variable and analyst forecast errors are insignificant. Also 
insignificant in the turnover equation is non-industry-adjusted ROA. Both stock returns and ana-
lyst forecast errors have negative and statistically significant coefficients.
27 Similar to the turnover equation, when we estimate Models 7, 8, and 9 using one dummy vari-
able based on whether the dispersion in the 5-year forecast is greater than the median for all firms, 
we find insignificant results for the dispersion variable and the interaction between the dispersion 
variable and industry-adjusted 5-year EPS growth rate forecast. The 5-year EPS growth rate fore-
cast is also no longer significant.
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likelihood of an outside replacement. Our interpretation of the results is that poor 
expectations combined with uncertainty increases the board of directors’ willing-
ness to make significant organizational change.
An alternative explanation is that dispersion increases prior to the appoint-
ment of an outside CEO because analysts anticipate a substantial change in firm 
leadership. According to this argument, we would expect that, after controlling 
for earnings expectations, one or more of the dispersion dummy variables would 
be statistically significant. Panel B of Table 5 shows that none of the dispersion 
dummy variables is statistically significant even when the interaction terms are 
excluded. We conclude that the dispersion measures do not reflect anticipation of 
an outside or inside replacement.
4.4. Analyst following and forecast dispersion
The results shown in Panel A of Table 5 indicate that firm-specific dispersion 
in 1-year EPS forecasts affects the relation between industry-adjusted analyst fore-
cast errors and the likelihood of CEO turnover. Similarly, Panel B of Table 5 indi-
cates that firm-specific dispersion in 5-year EPS growth rate forecasts affects the 
relation between industry-adjusted 5-year EPS growth rate forecasts and the like-
lihood of an outside replacement. An alternative explanation is that the firm-spe-
cific dispersion measure is capturing something other than abnormal uncertainty. 
For example, the firm-specific dispersion measure may be negatively related to the 
number of analysts following the firm even after controlling for the level of uncer-
tainty associated with the firm’s earnings. , 28 The number of analysts following the 
firm rather than uncertainty concerning the firm’s earnings forecast might be driv-
ing our results concerning the dispersion measure. To control for the number of an-
alysts following the firm, we partition the sample into two samples based on the 
median number of analysts making a 1-year EPS forecast Note that sample firms 
may switch between partitions over the sample period. We then estimate the bivar-
iate probit for the two partitions using the same specification as Model 9., 29
The Model 10 results shown in Panel A of Table 6 are consistent with the re-
sults shown in Table 5. Because Model 10 is estimated using only those obser-
vations where the number of analysts following the firm is less than or equal to 
the median, the findings suggest that the results shown in Table 5 are not driven 
by the number of analysts following the firm. Interestingly, the Model 11 results 
shown in Panel A indicate that analyst forecast errors have a significant impact 
on the likelihood of CEO turnover regardless of the level of uncertainty asso-
ciated with the forecast in those observations where the number of analysts is 
28 The number of analysts following the firm is negatively correlated with both the firm-specific dis-
persion in 1-year analyst forecast dummy variable (−0.090) and the firm-specific dispersion in 5-
year analyst forecast errors dummy variable (−0.026).
29 We partition the sample based on the number of analysts making a 1-year forecast rather than the 
number making a 5-year forecast because the 5-year forecast only enters the analysis directly for 
those firms experiencing a turnover. The correlation between the number of analysts making a 1-
year forecast and the number making a 5-year forecast is very high (0.827).
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greater than the median. These results suggest that if a large number of analysts 
are following the firm, then managers are held accountable for meeting earnings 
expectations even if there is disagreement among analysts concerning the fore-
cast. This is consistent with the argument that analysts and other commentators 
have forced corporate boards to become more active and independent to avoid 
the potential for adverse publicity and a resulting decline in firm value (Lowen-
stein, 1996) and Lowenstein, 1999).
Table 6. Bivariate probit regression results by analyst following
                                                              Expected             Model 10                      Model 11
Explanatory variables                                    sign       (# analysts ≤ median)  (# analysts > median)
Panel A: dependent variable—CEO turnover
Constant   –2.194 *** –2.118 ***
  (–4.527) (–4.279)
CEO age dummy (1 if CEO is older (+)  0.669 *** 0.963 ***
     than 60, 0 otherwise)  (6.700) (9.624)
Log of the number of firm employees (+)  0.041 0.063 
  (0.951) (1.629)
Industry homogeneity  (+)  0.086 1.080
  (0.077) (1.183)
Industry-adjusted stock returns  (–)  –0.158 –0.148
  (–1.001) (–0.805)
Industry-adjusted ROA (net income/assets) (–)  –1.852 ** –0.211 
  (–2.121) (–0.200)
Industry-adjusted analyst forecast errors (–)  –2.740 * –3.089 ***
  (–1.890) (–2.819)
High firm-specific dispersion in 1-year  (±)  0.057 0.083 
     EPS forecast dummy variable  (0.530) (0.827)
High firm-specific dispersion × industry- (+)  2.559 * 1.640 
     adjusted analyst forecast errors  (1.715) (1.303)
Number of observations   2,124  1,863
Number of turnovers   167  193
Panel B: dependent variable—outside replacement
Constant   –2.381 –0.120
  (–1.209) (–0.057)
Log of the number of firm employees (–)  –0.012 –0.237
  (–0.078) (–1.336)
Tenure of the outgoing CEO  (–)  –0.041 –0.027
  (–1.215) (–1.049)
Industry homogeneity  (+)  3.452 3.204
  (0.834) (1.008)
Industry-adjusted stock returns  (–)  0.210 0.792
  (0.439) (1.378)
Forced turnover of outgoing CEO  (+)  0.500 1.036 **
  (1.325) (2.161)
Industry-adjusted ROA (net income/assets) (–)  –1.884 –5.601
  (–0.695) (–1.463)
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Table 6 (continued).
                                                              Expected             Model 10                      Model 11
Explanatory variables                                    sign       (# analysts ≤ median)  (# analysts > median)
Industry-adjusted analyst forecast errors (–)  –0.021 1.394
  (–0.012) (0.403)
Industry-adjusted 1-year EPS forecast (±)  –3.182 –1.128
  (–0.682) (–0.184)
Industry-adjusted 5-year EPS growth  (–)  1.923 8.636 
      rate forecast  (0.505) (1.010)
High firm-specific dispersion in 5-year  (±)  0.362 –0.027
     EPS growth forecast dummy variable  (0.936) (–0.069)
High firm-specific dispersion × industry- (+)  –7.748 –20.966 * 
     adjusted 5-year growth rate forecast  (–1.181) (–1.933)
Number of observations   2,124  1,863
Number of turnovers   167  193
Number of outside appointments   47  36
Log likelihood function for bivariate probit  –605.29  –593.33
This table shows the bivariate probit regression results (with asymptotic t-statistics) with the sample 
partitioned by the number of analysts making 1-year EPS forecasts for the firm in a given year. The 
tables indicate the likelihood of CEO turnover and an outside replacement for a sample of 3,987 
firm-year observations, including 360 CEO turnovers of which 83 result in outside replacements. We 
eliminated 28 of the original 4,015 firm-year observations, including three turnover observations, 
due to insufficient forecast dispersion data. There are two dependent variables: Panel A one if CEO 
turnover occurs in a given firm year (zero otherwise) and Panel B one if the replacement CEO 
was appointed from outside the firm (zero if the replacement CEO was appointed from within the 
firm). The model is estimated as a bivariate probit model to control for the potential correlation in 
error terms for the two models. In addition, the model adjusts for sample selectivity bias because 
we only observe the preference for an outsider when turnover occurs. The independent variables 
are as follows. Dummy variables for each year are included in both the CEO turnover and outside 
replacement models. For brevity, however, the results concerning the time dummy variables are not 
shown here. Industry homogeneity is measured over the 1986–1997 period using the approach 
described by Parrino (1997). Unless otherwise noted, all other variables are measured at the end of 
the previous fiscal year. Log of the number of firm employees is our proxy for firm size. Tenure of 
the outgoing CEO is measured in years. The CEO age dummy variable takes on a value of one if the 
CEO is over the age of 60, zero otherwise. Forced turnover of outgoing CEO is a dummy variable 
that takes on a value of one if the turnover of the outgoing CEO was forced, zero if the turnover 
was voluntary. Industry-adjusted stock returns and ROA (net income/assets) are measured over 
the previous fiscal year. Industry-adjusted analyst forecast error is (realized EPS for the previous 
year − forecasted EPS at the beginning of the previous year)/stock price at the beginning of the 
previous year. Industry-adjusted 1-year EPS forecast is forecasted EPS for the year measured at the 
beginning of the year/stock price at the beginning of the year. Industry-adjusted 5-year EPS growth 
rate forecast is measured at the beginning of the year. The dispersions in forecasts are measured as 
the minimum of 10 or the standard deviation of the forecast divided by the absolute value of the 
forecast. The high firm-specific dispersion dummy variables are equal to one if the firm’s dispersion 
is higher than the industry median, zero otherwise. The high industry dispersions dummy variables 
are equal to one if the median industry dispersion is greater than the median for all firms, zero 
otherwise. Industry-adjusted variables are differenced from industry medians based on two-digit SIC 
codes. * **, * *, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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The results concerning the outside replacement decision are weaker when es-
timated for the partitioned sample. In fact, none of the explanatory variables are 
statistically significant for Model 10 in Panel B of Table 6. Only the forced-turn-
over variable and the interaction between high firm-specific dispersion in the 5-
year EPS growth rate forecast and the forecast itself are statistically significant for 
Model 11 in Panel B. This can be attributed, in part, to the small number of turn-
over observations in each partition and the relatively large number of explana-
tory variables, which includes year dummy variables.
Overall, the results based on the partitioned sample suggest that 1-year EPS 
forecasts act as a reasonable proxy for performance standards used in CEO turn-
over decisions when there is little uncertainty associated with the forecast, as 
compared to industry peers, or when there are a relatively large number of ana-
lysts following the firm. Conditional on turnover, the likelihood of an outside re-
placement is greater when 5-year EPS forecasts are low relative to industry peers, 
there is disagreement among analysts concerning the forecast, and there is a rela-
tively large number of analysts following the firm.
5. Conclusion
Using a sample of 4,015 firm-year observations that include 363 CEO turn-
overs that occurred during the 1986–1997 period, we find an increased likelihood 
of CEO turnover when the CEO is older than 60 years of age and the firm is rela-
tively large. Controlling for these factors and measures of firm performance, we 
also find an inverse relation between the likelihood of CEO turnover and the in-
dustry-adjusted 1-year analyst forecast errors when there is agreement (less dis-
persion) among analysts regarding 1-year earnings forecasts or a relatively large 
number of analysts follow the firm. We argue that the analyst forecast error is 
capturing the deviation from performance expectations rather than simply over-
all firm performance and that the board of directors uses expectations as part of 
the criteria in evaluating CEO performance.
For the firms that experience CEO turnover, we find an increased likelihood of 
an outside replacement when the outgoing CEO had a relatively short tenure and 
the outgoing CEO was forced to resign. Controlling for these factors and mea-
sures of firm performance, we find an inverse relation between industry-adjusted 
5-year EPS growth rate forecasts and the likelihood that an outsider is appointed 
CEO. However, we find that the negative relation between the growth rate fore-
cast and the likelihood of an outside replacement applies only to those firms with 
a high level of firm-specific dispersion in the forecast. This suggests that the 5-
year EPS growth rate forecast helps explain the CEO replacement decision only 
when there is uncertainty among analysts (and presumably board members) re-
garding the firm’s future growth prospects. Overall, the implication is that the 
decision to replace an outgoing CEO with an outside candidate is, in general, an 
attempt to improve the long-range earnings prospects for the firm rather than a 
reaction to poor historical performance.
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